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Harmonising Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules 
RITA DE LA FERIA 
 
This special issue of the Review is focussed upon the new EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD).1  Whilst not 
taking away from the significance of obtaining unanimous approval for this new Directive, the speed ± for standard 
EU timeframes ± in which it was approved is not only due to the need to fulfil the timeframe for BEPS 
implementation, but is in itself symptomatic of the level of urgency felt across EU Member States to respond to the 
challenges raised by the globalisation and digitalisation of the economy. 
The international tax system, and by extension the EU tax system, set out in the 1920s has traditionally been based 
upon the principles of source and residence.2  Whilst the system has never been perfect, and has been famously 
designated as D³IODZHGPLUDFOH´3 for many decades these two principles satisfactorily formed the basis for the 
allocation of taxing right rules; identifying which country had the jurisdiction to tax which income.  In the territorial 
and physical world of the 1920s, these principles were reasonably effective in identifying a country that had both 
the legitimacy to tax a specific income (substantive jurisdiction to tax), and the ability to collect that income tax 
(enforcement jurisdiction to tax).4  In the new globalised and digitalised world, however, these principles create 
serious distortions to international trade, amplified by attempts by both Governments and corporations to benefit 
from them, by engaging in either tax competition or in tax avoidance, respectively.  In this world, ascertaining which 
country or countries have, both substantive and enforcement jurisdiction to tax income, is no longer straightforward. 
The international response, and that of most Member States, has been an attempt at limiting tax competition 
through the introduction of concepts such as that of harmful ± as opposed to non-harmful ± tax competition; and 
an attempt at curtailing tax avoidance through the introduction of anti-avoidance rules and principles.  We have 
therefore witnessed in the last decade to a proliferation of anti-avoidance rules: general (GAARs) and special 
(SAARs); international (BEPS) and national.5  It is against this background that the new ATAD sits.  Whilst 
ostensibly an attempt at ensuring harmonised implementation of BEPS within the EU, the ATAD has at its heart a 
wider concern about establishing a level playing field within the Internal Market. In order to ensure that a minimum 
level of protection against tax avoidance applies in all Member States, the ATAD aims at preventing the extensive 
use of lenient approaches to tax avoidance as a form of tax competition. 
This Issue includes six articles, which discuss various aspects of the new Directive. In the first article, Ana Paula 
Dourado discusses thin capitalisation and the new interest deductibility limitation rule in Article 4 of the ATAD, 
questioning whether the new rules are compatible with existing CJEU case-law.6 Steven Peeters then discusses 
how exit taxation has been reformulated in Article 5 of the ATAD as an anti-avoidance rule, by concentrating on 
the taxation of unrealised capital gains.7 From Special Anti-Avoidance Rules (SAARS) to General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule (GAARs), attention then turns to Article 6 of the ATAD, with an analysis by Luc de Broe and Dorien Beckers 
of that Article in the context of principle of prohibition of abuse of law, as developed by the CJEU, as well as other 
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recent anti-abuse measures.8 From the GAAR, back to SAARS: Jens Schönfeld focusses on CFC rules, and the 
minimum standards set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the ATAD, arguing that the new provisions will not revolutionise 
CFC rules but questioning their compatibility with Cadbury Schweppes.9 That article is then followed by Gijs Fibbe 
and Ton Stevens¶DQDO\VLVRI the new provision in Article 9 of the ATAD on hybrid mismatches, where they compare 
it with one initially proposed by the European Commission, and assesse both provisions in the context of the BEPS 
requirements.10   In the final article, after those dedicated to each of the general and special anti-avoidance rules 
included in the ATAD, Gianluigi Bizioli makes an overall analysis of the Directive, looking in particular at the 
compatibility of its various provisions with both the fundamental freedoms and the CJEU case-law, questioning the 
hierarchy of legal sources.11 
After decades of CJEU case-law on national anti-avoidance measures, it is hard to overestimate the significance 
of the new ATAD for EU tax policy.  The ATAD is not, however, a panacea. Whilst necessary elements of any tax 
system as last resort measures, anti-avoidance rules are, inherently, limited in scope and temporary in nature. 
They address the symptoms, not the causes of international tax avoidance.  The ATAD is a good step forward. 
Now we need to fix the fundamentals of the international corporate income tax system.12 
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